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The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimality of the monetary authorities reaction function in 
the two-area medium size model MARCOS (US and euro areas). The parameters and the horizons of 
output gap and inflation expectations of the Taylor rule are computed in order to minimise a loss 
function of the monetary authorities. However, investigating the optimality of the Taylor rule in the 
context of a large scale macroeconomic model raises several difficulties: the model is non-linear and 
all the state variables potentially enter the optimal monetary policy rule. Furthermore, the optimality 
of the Taylor rule is assessed by the minimisation of the loss function under the constraint of a large 
forward-looking model. To overcome these problems, Black, Macklem and Rose [1998] propose a 
stochastic simulation based method which has been applied to single-country macroeconomic models. 
To study the optimality of the Taylor rule in the case of a two-area model, we suppose that the 
economy is stochastically hit by numerous shocks (supply, demand, monetary, exchange rate and 





L’objectif de ce travail est d’examiner l’optimalité de la fonction de réaction des autorités monétaires 
dans le modèle à deux zones (USA et zone euro) de taille moyenne MARCOS. Les paramètres et 
l’horizon des anticipations de l’output gap et de l’inflation sont déterminés de façon à minimiser une 
fonction de perte des autorités monétaires. Cependant, l’examen de l’optimalité de la fonction de 
réaction des autorités monétaires dans le contexte d’un modèle de grande taille soulève plusieurs 
difficultés : le modèle est non linéaire  et toutes les variables d’état entrent potentiellement dans la 
règle de politique monétaire. En outre, l’optimalité de la règle de Taylor est établie par la minimisation 
d’une fonction de perte sous la contrainte d’un modèle de grande taille avec des anticipations 
rationnelles. Pour résoudre ces difficultés, Black, Macklem and Rose [1998] proposent une méthode 
fondée sur des simulations stochastiques qui a été appliquée sur un modèle à un sel pays. Pour étudier 
l’optimalité de la règle de Taylor dans le cadre d’un modèle à deux zones, on suppose que chaque zone 
subit divers chocs stochastiques (offre, demande, monétaire, taux de change, demande mondiale) et on 
simule MARCOS de façon stochastique. 
                                                      
This paper has been written when authors were at the Banque de France (Centre de recherche). The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessary represent the views of the Banque de France. We would like to thanks Christian Bordes, Jean-Pierre 
Laffargue and the participants at the meeting on the “Impact of Alternative Policy Rules” in Royaumont, June 2002, for their helpful 
comments and remarks. Obviously, the remaining errors are our own.  
1 European Central Bank (pascal.jacquinot@ecb.int) 
2 Université d'Evry EPEE (ferhat.mihoubi@eco.univ-evry.fr) 
  1 
1-  Introduction 
 
The optimality of the monetary reaction function has been intensively investigated in many 
respects. First, the properties of a simple monetary rule, generally a Taylor rule, are compared 
to a more sophisticated one deduced from an optimisation framework (Rudebusch and 
Svensson [1999]). Second, the parameters and the horizon of inflation expectation of the 
Taylor rule are computed in order to minimise a loss function of the monetary authorities 
(Batini and Haldane [1999], Batini and Nelson [2000], Jondeau and Le Bihan [2000]). We 
retain the second approach to examine the optimality of the monetary reaction function. 
 
For tractability purpose, the optimality of the monetary reaction function is usually studied in 
a simplify framework where the economy is described as a VAR or a small structural model. 
These models are generally composed of two or three equations: an IS curve, a Phillips curve 
and an UIP relation. However, in those cases the description of monetary policy channels is 
rather poor. The impacts of interest rate are considered only through a reduced form equation 
(the IS curve) entangling contradictory effects such as the substitution and wealth effects on 
consumption, capital cost on investment and competitiveness through real exchange rate on 
external trade.  
 
Black, Macklem and Rose [1998], Drew and Hunt [1999], Yuong [2000] investigate different 
monetary policy rules or the uncertainty about the monetary transmission delay in the context 
of a large scale macroeconomic model (QPM and FPS). However, computing the efficiency 
frontier to examine the optimal monetary policy in the context of a large scale model raises 
several difficulties. Because the model is non linear and all the state variables enter the 
optimal monetary policy rule, its computation becomes intractable for large scale models. 
Furthermore, the optimality of the Taylor rule is assessed by the minimisation of a loss 
function under the constraint of the model. In the context of a large scale model, especially if 
it is calibrated, the task is rather tricky. To overcome this problem, Black, Macklem and Rose 
[1998] propose a stochastic simulation based method which has been applied to single-
country macroeconomic models (Black, Macklem and Rose [1998] for QPM and Drew and 
Hunt [1999], Yuong [2000] for FPS).  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the optimality of the Taylor rule in the case of a calibrated 
two-area model, MARCOS (Jacquinot and Mihoubi [2003a], [2003b]). The optimal Taylor 
rule will be the one with the parameter set minimising the criterion composed of the variances 
of output, inflation and interest rate. We suppose that the economy is stochastically hit by 
numerous shocks (supply, demand, monetary, exchange rate and world demand). For this 
purpose, MARCOS is stochastically simulated. The optimality of the Taylor rule is examined 
with respect to either the parameters or the horizon related to inflation and output gap using 
Black, Macklem and Rose [1998] methodology.  
 
The first part of the paper is devoted to MARCOS presentation whereas the optimality of the 
Taylor rule is discussed in the second part. The last part deals with the results of stochastic 
simulations. 
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2-  MARCOS at a glance 
 
MARCOS (Modèle à Anticipations Rationnelles de la COnjoncture Simulée, Jacquinot and 
Mihoubi [2000]) is a yearly model designed for economic policy evaluation. It is calibrated 
and composed of two area-blocks: the euro and US areas. The goal of MARCOS is to get a 
comprehensive and understandable tool to analyze economic policies. MARCOS is a 
medium-size model (around 100 equations for each area) with a coherent accounting 
framework and rational expectations. 
 
The overall coherence of the model is ensured by a top down strategy (from theoretical 
structure to equations). A balanced growth path exists and explicitly comes from the short-
term dynamics of the model. Parameters in equations are structural and invariant to economic 
policy shocks. They are directly derived from different agents optimising framework 
(households, unions, firms). The MARCOS’s supply side homogeneity is thus guaranteed and 
the wage-setting follows a bargaining process. Forward looking expectations are model-path 
consistent. They appear in the real sphere: consumption, investment, fiscal-authority reaction 
function; as well as in the nominal sphere: Phillips curve, monetary-authority reaction 
function, Fisher equation, uncovered interest rate parity. 
 
Recent works implementing this approach include Laffargue [1995], MARMOTTE (Cadiou, 
Stéphane, Guichard, Kadareja, Laffargue, Rzepkowski [2001]), QPM (Black, Laxton, Rose, 
and Tetlow [1994], Coletti, Hunt, Rose and Tetlow [1996]), QUEST II (Roeger and in’t Veld 
[1997]), FPS (Black, Cassino, Drew, Hansen, Hunt, Rose, and Scott [1997]), and 
MULTIMOD Mark III (Laxton, Isard, Faruqee, Prasad, and Turtelboom [1998]). MARCOS 
slightly differs from these models by its more general theoretical framework: we 
simultaneously assume monopolistic competition, wage bargaining and life cycle hypothesis. 
Five agents are retained in MARCOS: households, firms, public administration, rest of the 
world and unions.  
 
 




Consumption is split between workers and retired in a pay-as-you-go retirement scheme. 
Following Gertler [1997], at each date working age households face a constant probability to 
become retire and retired households face a constant probability to die. In addition, two kinds 
of households are distinguished whether they can access or not to the financial markets. The 
neo-classical households, that are non-constrained, hold treasury bonds, capitalized value of 
social security benefits and firms and determine their consumption by maximising their inter-
temporal utility function. Income is determined by real wages under the assumption of a life 
cycle bell-shaped (Faruqee, Laxton and Symansky [1997]).  
 
Firms and Unions 
 
The firms operate in a monopolistic competition framework with a CES technology. Their 
decisions obey to the following sequence: first, they determine investment and capital; second 
they bargain wages with unions and then fix unilaterally employment. The profit 
maximisation program including capital adjustment costs gives investment thus related to the 
  3Tobin’s q.3 Employment, subject to adjustment cost, is determined by the labour demand 
given the wage bargained. Wages are deduced from a right to manage model. Furthermore, 
modelling the wage-bargaining process allows computing an equilibrium unemployment rate 
consistent with both workers and firms’ objectives. In a profit optimizing framework, the 
labour demand equation cannot be distinguished from the value added price equation. The 




The government raises direct and indirect taxes. The personal income tax rate is endogenous 
and adjusted by the government in order to reach a public debt target. The employer social 
contribution rate is endogenously determined in order to guarantee the long-term social 
budget equilibrium. In the short run the employer social contribution rate is exogenous and 
the government guaranties the equilibrium of social account. 
 
Rest of the world 
 
The foreign trade equations are rather traditional with exports and imports respectively 
depending upon world demand, domestic demand and price competitiveness. 
 
The nominal rigidities  
 
The nominal block is composed of seven prices: demand price, value added price, 
consumption price, investment price, public expenditures price, import and export deflators. 
In order to take account of nominal rigidities and pressures on the price setting, the demand 
price is modelled by a hybrid Phillips curve with model consistent expectations. The Phillips 
curve describes the relationship between the rate of inflation ( ) and the output gap where 
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With  0 > ψ . Current inflation depends upon the past inflation ( 1 − t π ) and the expected 
inflation for the next period ( ). Furthermore, expectations completely forward 
looking (i.e. when 
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Four interest rates are included in MARCOS: the one-year interest rate, the ten-year interest 
rate, the composite interest rate associated to the public debt (mix of the two previous ones) 
and the foreign short-term interest rate. Short term and long term interest rates are related by a 
yield curve with a constant term premium. Monetary authorities fix the short-term interest rate 
according to an inflation and output-gap targeting. These interest rates have three types of 
effects on the real sphere. First, they directly influence the neo-classical households’ 
                                                      
3The stock market is supposed in perfect information situation. 
  4consumption via wealth and saving-consumption substitution effects as well as investment via 
the optimal capital stock which equates the long-term capital productivity and the real interest 
rate. Second, they directly determine levels of public and external debts and thus the 
households’ wealth. Third, they determine the exchange rate by the uncovered interest rate 
parity relationship and then modify the price competitiveness and the trade balance. 
 
The reaction function 
 
The reaction function is a Taylor rule type (Taylor [1993]): monetary authorities control the 
nominal short-term interest rate (r ), reacting to shocks on inflation or deviations of output 
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  represents the output gap. However, this version of 
the Taylor rule differs from the original version by the fact that it is not the level of the 
interest rate but its changes that enter the monetary rule. Thus, to bring back the interest rate 
to its based line value, it is not sufficient that the initial shock vanishes, but this shock has to 
be compensated with an opposite shock of the same magnitude. In others words, this version 
of the Taylor rule displays some hysteresis effect. The direct consequence is that in case of 
inflation pressure the monetary authorities behave more aggressively than in the case of an 
usual Taylor rule (in case of a permanent shock the interest rate does not increase once for all 
but increase continuously). A second implication of this version of the Taylor rule is the 
invalidity of the usual indeterminacy condition ( 1 µ < ): small values of µ could be 
considered. Furthermore, this specification captures the high value of the optimal parameter 
associated to the lagged interest rate in several models. As pointed out by Levin, Vieland and 
Wiliams [1999], this reaction function form performs much better than the traditional Taylor 
rule, provides efficiency frontiers comparable to those given by more complicated rules 
(including additional lags or variables), and is less sensitive to model uncertainty. In addition, 
this specification takes into account the strong persistency of the interest rate.4 
 
Area blocks linkage 
 
The linkage variables between the areas are interest rates, exchange rates, foreign demand and 
foreign prices. Hence, exchange rates (euro/US-dollar, euro/foreign currencies and US-
dollar/foreign currencies) are deduced from an uncovered interest rate parity. The foreign 
demand for each area is the sum of the US, the euro area and the rest-of-the-world imports 
weighted by their respective shares in the area imports. For each area, the foreign price 
depends upon exports prices of the other areas.  
 
 In the long run, the real interest rates are identical in the three areas. To balance the model, 
the rest of the world guarantees the trade balance equilibrium. 
 
                                                      
4 Note however that examining the optimal Taylor rule letting the past value of interest rate unknown is time consuming. So, we have not 
used such a specification in order to limit the number of parameters over which we have to optimize in the Taylor rule. Furthermore, 
empirical evidences indicate that this coefficient is rather close to one.  
 
  52.2- Calibration 
 
The specifications of both euro area and US are identical, obviously calibrations are different.  
Jacquinot and Mihoubi [2003b] report the coefficients values and the main features of the 
steady state for the euro area and the US. The euro area and US model are calibrated using 
respectively annual data provided by Eurostat and the ECB and OECD Main Economic 
Indicator database. 
 
Methodology and common features 
 
The calibration relies on the assumption that the economies are on average at their steady state 
during the period 1985-1997. Thus variables describing the steady state are put to their 1985-
1997 sample mean values. During the calibration, variables in level (GDP and employment 
for example) are set to their 1997 values. Ratios and rates (shares of the different components 
of the demand in the GDP, ratios of the different debts to the GNP and taxes rates,…) are 
supposed to be equal to their mean on the 1985-1997 sample.  For unobserved parameters two 
cases could be considered: parameters considered as endogenous during the calibration – the 
model is inverted –  and parameters set to realistic values.  
 
The share of Keynesian household consumption is endogenous during the calibration. Its 
value (44%) is deduced from the simulation of the overall model taking into account 
constraints on the household wealth and on their consumption. The retire probability is 2.5% 
implying an expected working time of 40 years and the death probability is equal to 5% 
corresponding to an expected adult life time of 60 years. The coefficients determining the path 
of the wage income during the adult life time are set such that the labour income has the usual 
life cycle pattern (Figure 1).   
 
The capital depreciation rate is set to 4.5% in order to be in line with the investment rate at the 
steady state. We get a capital life time of 22 years. The bargaining power of the union is set to 
0.5 leading to a gain, coming from the matching of a vacant job with an unemployed worker, 
equally shared between the employer and the employee. In order to get a mark-up rate about 
10%, the price elasticity of the good demand is equal to 11. The adjustment cost is set to 3 on 
capital and to 2 on labour.   
 
Parameters of the monetary policy reaction function are those proposed by Taylor [1993]: the 
parameter related to inflation µ is equal to 1.5 and the parameter which measure the 
sensibility to the output gap is set to 0.5. Thus the central bank is more aggressive on inflation 
than on activity.  
  
















Main differences between the two areas rely on the choice of retirement ratio for pay-as-you-
go system (the ratio of public pension per capita over wages per capita is 40% for euro area 
and 5% for US). The technology differs also from the euro area: the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital is close to 1 for euro area but smaller for the US with a value of 
0.6. At the steady state, the unemployment rate (which measures only the compensated 
unemployment) is equal to its estimated equilibrium value of 8.6% for the euro area and 
6.13% for the US. Phillips curve is less sensitive to output gap in the for euro area (0.045 
against 0.12 for the US). The equations for external trade have been estimated. Our finding is 
that price elasticity of imports is much higher in the US (1.92 versus 0.8 in the euro area). 
 
 
3-  Optimal Taylor rule 
 
Optimal coefficients  
 
The optimality of the monetary policy rule is defined as the suitable calibration of the Taylor 
rule. We mean by suitable, the values of the coefficients of the Taylor rule that minimise a 
weighted sum of variances of output, inflation and interest rate conditional on the model. 
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  7Where   is the logarithm of output,   its potential value,  t y
*
t y t π  the inflation,   the inflation 
target, and r  the nominal interest rate. Equation (2) is the usual Taylor rule whereas equation 
(3) corresponds to the overall model (the monetary policy rule excepted) with   and   the 
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t ε β  is 
the discount factor. 
 
The model (3) is usually (Ball [1997], Jondeau Le Bihan [2000]) composed of an IS curve and 
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with   to verify the long-run verticality of the Phillips curve. Due to the linearity of the 
model, the analytical solution is then straightforward. It can be shown (Svensson [1998]) that 
the model admits the following AR(1) form: 
1 ) 1 ( = A
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With   a matrix depending upon  B µ  and τ  
The whole system could then be rewritten as: 
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with V()Ω = t ε  and   a quadratic form of the model coefficients including  B B D ⊗ = µ  and 




The monetary policy affects the economy with some delay. The monetary authority has to 
take into account the transmission delay to conduct its policy. And in presence of transmission 
lag, it will be sub-optimal to target the current inflation rate rather than its future value. The 
issue here is: what is the optimal horizon of monetary policy? In other words, what are the 
  8leads in the Taylor rule for inflation rate target as well as for output gap that minimise the loss 
criterion? This question of the optimal horizon could be related to Batini and Nelson [2000] 
OFH definition: “the optimal feedback horizon (‘OFH’) [is] the best point in the future for 
which the authorities should form the inflation forecast that enter their policy rule”. Batini and 
Nelson [2000] consider only inflation targeting. We extend the optimal horizon to the output-
gap target.  
 
The transmission delay depends upon the openness of the area. For an open economy the 
exchange rate channel operates faster than the output-gap channel. Nevertheless, even in open 
countries the transmission delay is still significant. In MARCOS, both areas present a weak 
degree of openness.  
 
Concretely, to compute the optimal horizon we minimise the loss function (1) respect to kµ 




















Implementation with MARCOS 
 
Applying Ball [1997] or Svensson [1998] methods to MARCOS raises several difficulties. 
First, MARCOS presents strong non-linearity. Its linearization around the steady state is a 
cumbersome task and leads to an approximated rather than an exact solution. The other 
solution consisting in simulating stochastically the model for a set of coefficients rather than 
solving it analytically has to be considered despite its difficult implementation. In this case, 
each shock in MARCOS has to be uncorrelated with the contemporaneous endogenous 
variables. Due to the forward-lookingness of MARCOS, at each period the model is solved 
taking into account the path formed by all the future periods. If we simulate stochastically at 
once a full path, the residuals of future periods will be correlated with the current endogenous. 
To avoid such a problem, we have to simulate the model as follow. At each date we introduce 
a shock at the current period and we set it to zero for all the following periods and we 
simulate the entire path. This procedure could be repeated date after date to get a complete 
path of stochastic shocks. So to simulate a complete path of T periods stochastic shocks we 
have to run T forward-looking simulations of the model.  
 
Second, MARCOS is calibrated around its equilibrium steady state rather than estimated. It 
means that we do not dispose of a residuals covariance matrix. Thus, the matrix Ω in the 
minimisation problem is unknown and furthermore applying stochastic simulations is 
impossible since we do not know the residual distribution. 
 
 
4-  Stochastic simulations 
 
The stochastic simulation strategy 
 
The main issue here is how to run stochastic simulations in MARCOS whereas it is mainly 
calibrated. For estimated models, the exercise is quite easy: shocks are simply drawn from the 
distribution of estimated residuals. In our case, we suppose (as Black et al. [1997] for QPM 
and Drew and Hunt [1998] for FPS) that the economy could be approximated by a reduced 
form core model and the estimation of the core model will give the distribution of shocks 
  9required by the stochastic simulation. The VAR methodology is the most appropriated to get 
such a core model. According to the VAR literature, the economy is hit by independent 
innovations and impulse responses are run in order to identify them. Each residual of the 
VAR model could finally be expressed as combination of these innovations. In order to 
proceed to stochastic simulations, residual terms are added to some behavioural equations of 
MARCOS and defined such that the model could mimic the impulse responses given by the 
VAR. 
 
Two VAR are estimated: one for each area. This strategy of estimating two different VAR for 
a two-country model can be first justified by the weakness of the links between areas (in the 
model). Furthermore, each VAR should be large enough to capture the main shocks the US 
and euro zones are supposed to face. But estimating a too large VAR (with annual data) could 
raise some degree of freedom problems.5 For both zones, the VAR is composed of the five 
following variables: world demand, world demand deflator, consumption, demand deflator 
and yield curve. Volumes and the yield curve are in level, prices are computed in growth rate. 
The order of appearance of the variables gives the causal ordering of the VAR and 
consequently its identification scheme. The priority of foreign variables with respect to 
domestic variables indicates the top position of the foreign sector in the causal hierarchy of 
the model. The last position of interest rates signifies that the monetary authority reacts to all 
the previous information. The interpretation of innovations associated to each equation is 
quite standard. The first two shocks are respectively the world demand shock and the terms of 
trade shock whereas the shock to the consumption can be viewed as a demand shock and the 
shock to the demand price as a supply shock on the Phillips curve. The shock to the yield 
curve is interpreted as a monetary shock.  
 
The VAR is estimated over the 1970-2000 period for the euro area and the 1974-1997 period 
for the US. The number of lags, equal to one, has been determined by AICC and Schwarz 
criteria. Impulses are responses to a one-standard-deviation shock on each innovation.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the instantaneous impulse responses of the VAR models, computed from 
a Cholesky decomposition of residuals variance-covariance matrix. Results are rather 
standard. For a world demand innovation, we have a positive impact on consumption and thus 
on prices implying a short-term interest rate increase (a decrease in the yield curve). The 
foreign inflation shock induces a rise in domestic inflation, a consumption contraction and a 
short-run interest rate increase. The positive shock on consumption involves a weak 
deflationary effect whereas the impact on the yield curve is positive in the euro area and 
negative but negligible in the US. This difference suggests that ECB is less tolerant to 
inflation than the fed. Finally the positive shock on domestic inflation involves an increase in 
the short-run interest rate. 
 
                                                      
5 A VAR for both areas will contain 10 variables. With two lags, the number of parameters to be estimated for each equation is equal to 20! 
That is particularly expensive for annual data. 
  10Table 1: Instantaneous response of the VAR model variable for the euro area 






growth rate  Yield curve 
World  demand  2685  0 0 0 0 
World demand 
deflator growth rate  -0.002 0.038  0  0  0 
Consumption 14829  -5693  6895  0  0 
Consumption price 
index growth rate  0.002 0.01 -0.001  0.008  0 




Table 2: Instantaneous response of the VAR model variable for the United-States 






growth rate  Yield curve 
World  demand  9677  0 0 0 0 
World demand 
deflator growth rate  0.015 0.055  0  0  0 
Consumption 22200  -15036  50046  0  0 
Consumption price 
index growth rate  0.008 0.004 -0.003 0.01  0 
Yield  curve  -0.004  -0.003 -0.0002 -0.003  0.006 
 
 
Introduction of stochastic shocks in MARCOS 
 
The VAR gives an estimate of the response for the five variables to each innovation and the 
problem is how to design MARCOS to exactly replicate the impulse responses function (IRF) 
of the VAR over the first period (one year), i.e. before any effect of economic policy. The aim 
is here to catch the purely exogenous shocks hitting the economy and for this reason the 
period should be free of any policy effect. On the one hand, the VAR identifies the 
innovations, their standard deviations, and also produces a precise picture of the dynamics of 
the economy. On the other hand, and by construction, MARCOS has no residuals. The 
strategy will be to use the information given by the VAR to introduce the appropriate residual 
terms in behavioural equations of MARCOS. These terms are added to the level of 
behavioural equations of MARCOS whose economic definition is the nearest to the one of the 
VAR. Their role is to give the deviation from the steady state that will permit the replication 
of the IRF. These residuals will be a combination of the innovations. Once weights 
determined, the stochastic simulations can finally be implemented from a normal distribution 
N(0,1). 
 
Contributions of innovations to MARCOS residuals are computed as follow. Let us take the 
case of a world demand shock in the euro zone. First the IRF of the VAR to a world demand 
shock (responses of the five variables to this shock) are retrieved. Second, add-factors are 
introduced in MARCOS not only in the corresponding five equations of the euro area but also 
in the same five equations of the US area. They are introduced in both areas in order to take 
account of all inter-relationships. Third, the model is simulated over 50 periods (the time to be 
sure that all variables reach their steady state) with add-factors as endogenous and behavioural 
variables as exogenous. The monetary reaction function is switched off to assure the 
  11independence of computed residual terms from the structural form of the reaction function. 
The weights of the first innovation to MARCOS residuals are then retrieved. The 
contributions of the world demand innovation to the one-period residuals are obtained. 
Fourth, the procedure is applied for all IRF and fifth, re-iterated for the next period. 
MARCOS could now be stochastically simulated.  
 
As previously noticed, the forward-lookingness induces a stochastic simulation run date by 
date to get a complete path. These simulations have to be repeated for the number of 
replications. The simulation protocol retained is of 30 replications over 50 periods. As pointed 
out for FPS by Drew and Hunt [1998], for less than 30 replications standard deviation of 
output display instability.6  
 
Formally, given the estimated reduced form: 
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with   and where   is the vector of the five dependent variables, A(L) the lag 
polynomial matrix, L the lag operator. The associated structural VAR is: 
Σ = ) ( t v V t X
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The shocks   are iid N(0, I) with I the identity matrix. B is a matrix such that  t ε Σ = B B' .   
has five independent components   where a single-period unitary shock on   produces the 

















where   is a selector vector of zeros excepted the jth row equal to one. 
j ι ε
j
t  are N(0, 1) 
random numbers. 
 
Now let us construct the residual terms that MARCOS needs to replicate the IRF. To the 
equation i is associated the residual term u  (with i
i
t 1,...,10 =  in order to catch direct as well as 
indirect effects, 5 for each area). As noticed before, the random number   represents the 
innovation associated to the variable j of the VAR. Each simulation gives the numerical value 




t i, α 1 = t  since the IRF are replicated for the 











whereas  u  for  0 =
i
t 1 ≠ t . 
 
It is worth noting, that in addition of cross correlation, Drew and Hunt [1998] allow for serial 
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with K the order of autocorrelation correction. For MARCOS K=0. 
 
In order to get comparable results, our different stochastic simulations innovations have to be 
identical for all experiments. For this reason we maintained the same seed to the random 
generator. We also have skip the 20 first observations of each stochastic simulations in order 
to have results unaffected by initial conditions (here deterministic). 
 
 
5-  Results 
 
Optimal Taylor rule coefficients 
 
Theses simulations are carried out for each area (euro and US) on a mesh composed of 30 
nodes ( = µ 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, 2 and  = τ 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1). For each shock, we compute 
the Taylor rule coefficients minimising the overall criterion or specifically the variance of the 
output gap, the variance of the inflation gap or the variance of interest rate changes. For the 
global criterion the weighting parameters  y λ ,  π λ ,  r λ ,  β  have been set equal respectively to 
1, 1, 0.5  and 1/1 . For one stochastic simulation we report the coefficients which minimise 
the different criteria for each area (for the other area the Taylor rule coefficients are: 
.04
5 . 1 = µ  
and  5 . 0 = τ ).  
 
It is worth noting that Blanchard and Kahn [1980] conditions depend on µ  and τ  values. For 
some range of values these conditions could not be met. For example,  0 = µ  leads to 
indeterminacy (the number of non redundant lead variables exceeds the number of 
eigenvalues greater than one) and this case has been ruled out.7 
 
Results reported in Tables 3 exhibit analogies between the two areas. Hence, the optimal 
coefficients are nearly identical except for the overall criteria. For an output objective, the 
optimal Taylor rule is obtained by putting all the weight on the output-gap parameter and the 
smallest value to the inflation-gap parameter. In the same manner, when the monetary 
authorities have an inflation objective, their optimal strategy is to react strongly to inflation. It 
is worth noting that even if the monetary authorities have a unique objective of inflation, they 
still put a weak but strictly positive weight on the output gap: 0.2 for the euro area and 0.4 for 
the US. This difference could be related to the larger Phillips effect in the US. To get an 
inflation-gap reduction the fed can also target the output gap because of the magnitude of the 
Phillips effect. The higher the output-gap coefficient in the Phillips curve the stronger is the 
improvement in the inflation reduction. So for the US the monetary authorities take advantage 
of this highest Phillips effect. Concerning the interest rate change criteria, results are quite 
obvious: the variance of interest rates change is minimised if the central bank does not react, 
i.e. µ and τ  are equal to 0.  
 
As far as the global criterion is retained by central banks, the US presents a reaction function 
less aggressive to inflation than the euro area (less than 0.4 for the US against more than 2 for 
the euro area). But according to our findings, the Fed seems to pay more attention to the 
                                                      
7 See Taylor rule presentation in section 2.1 for the remark about first difference Taylor rule properties and indeterminacy conditions. 
  13output gap than the ECB. The difference between the two areas could be related to their 
different volatility features for output gap and inflation. The US seems to be characterised by 
a higher variance on output gap whereas the inflation appears to be more volatile in the euro 
area. Because the objective of the central bank is a mixture of the three variances, its optimal 
attitude is to put more weight on the more volatile component. 
 
It is noticeable that output-gap coefficient is, whatever the objective of the central bank, 
always strictly positive (contrary to the Batini and Nelson [2000] assumption). The coefficient 
τ  is always greater than 0.2 (at the exception of the particular interest-rate variance criterion) 
implying a reaction function containing the output gap.  
 
Table 3: Optimal coefficients in the Taylor rule  
 EA  US 
  µ   τ   µ   τ  
) (Y V   0.4 ≤   1 ≥   0.4 ≤   1 ≥  
) (π V   2 ≥   0.2  2 ≥   0.4 
) (dr V   0.4 ≤   0  0.4 ≤   0 
V(criteria)  2 ≥   0.4  0.4 ≤   1 ≥  
 
 
Optimal Taylor rule horizon 
 
To compute the optimal horizon, we proceed as previously by searching on a grid formed of 
30 nodes (k  and  (0,1 ,2,3,4) = µ (0,1,2,3,4,5) k ).  = τ
When an objective of output-gap stability is tracked, the optimal behaviour of the monetary 
authorities is to react to immediate deviations of output and inflation from their target (Table 
4). As noted previously, if the stability of the interest rate is targeted the central bank should 
avoid large movement in the interest rate and hence retain the longer horizon as possible. 
These results could be compared to those of Batini and Nelson [2000] despite their different 
specification of the reaction function (only inflation and an auto-regressive term enter the 
reaction function). With a small forward-looking model they found an optimal horizon 
inferior to one year (2 quarters) and a coefficient related to inflation in the Taylor rule equal to 
1.2. In our case, with the same criterion ( y λ ,  π λ ,  r λ  and β  set equal to 1, 1, 0.5 and 1/1 ), 
we found an optimal lag of 0 year on both inflation and output gap.  
.04
 
Table 4: Optimal leads in the Taylor rule  
 EA  US 
  µ k   τ k   µ k   τ k  
) (Y V   0 0 0 0 
) (π V   1 3 0 1 
) (dr V   1 5 4 5 
V(criteria)  0 0 0 0 
 
 
  14Efficient frontiers 
 
Efficient frontiers for the euro area and the US are exhibited in Figures 2 and 3. We found the 
usual trade-off between inflation and output gap. As expected, the frontier is convex to the 
origin. Its top left value corresponds to a unique objective of inflation stabilisation whilst its 
bottom right value corresponds to a pure objective of output-gap variance minimisation.  
 
The main difference relies on the larger variance of output gap in the US than in the euro area, 
at the opposite of what could be observed for inflation. Two mechanisms could be invoked to 
explain this large dispersion of the output gap: first, the high volatility of the innovations 
associated to the output gap; second, the strength of the persistency of the propagation in the 
model. Clearly, the propagation mechanism in MARCOS are more persistent for the euro area 
than for the US (the Phillips effect and the sensitivity of imports to the real exchange rate are 
both higher for the US). Furthermore, the variance of the innovations is systematically larger 
in the US. As a consequence, the larger variance of the output gap could be originated from a 
greater dispersion of the shock governing output gap in the US.  
 







































  15Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper investigates the optimality of the Taylor rule using the two-area model MARCOS 
with respect to the parameters as well as horizon. The results suggest that if the criterion 
considered by the central bank combines variances of output gap, inflation gap and interest rat 
changes, the fed seems to be more sensitive to output gap whereas ECB seems to be more 
aggressive with respect to inflation. Considering the same criterion, the optimal horizon for 
both central banks corresponds to an infra-annual targeting on inflation and output gap as 
well. 
 
Three aspects could be improved. So far, we have used a constrained form of the Taylor rule 
with the changes in the interest rate depending on output gap and inflation gap. In other 
words, we have not examined the degree of interest-rate smoothing in the reaction function. 
This parameter provides additional information on the timing of the optimal monetary policy 
rule. In a same perspective, stochastic simulations could also be extended to minimise the 
different criteria with respect to parameters and leads of the Taylor rule. However, as noted 
above, it is an expensive task in CPU time. In a multi-area model perspective, we could also 
investigate the optimal monetary policy of one area considering the optimality of the reaction 
function of the other area.  
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